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It is acknowledged that many understandings of regulation focus on firms or industry sectors with defined roles and responsibilities. That is, regulatory efforts have involved regulatory organisations active in the monitoring of compliance with standards set either by the state alone or by the state in consultation with the targeted industry sector. Obvious examples are the WorkCover Authority that has regulatory responsibilities in the area of occupational health and safety and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission.
These regulators are active, and pro-active, in terms of the regulation of those under their purview.
8 Such a regulator does not exist in the regulation of patented inventions. 9 Despite the lack of central institution however, there are aspects of the Patents Act that render it amenable to analysis through the use of regulatory theory; those aspects include the setting of standards of patentability 10 and the facilitation of enforcement of the standards (through civil and criminal penalties). 11 This article does not prescribe reforms based on this regulatory approach (there is not the space); it does, nonetheless, discuss a number of benefits that arise from the adoption of the approach.
The Historical Context and the Lack of Clear Normative Standards
First, though, there needs to be a discussion of the problems with the current view of the system. Key here are the assumptions made about the patent system that do not take
Patents Act, therefore, with its authorisation of limited monopolies and the inclusion of mechanisms for monitoring both patent grants and the behaviour of those with a responsibility for seeking the monopolies is a key aspect of the regulation of the innovation economy. 8 They monitor compliance with the law; they have a role in the enforcing of the law and, importantly, they set policies -with the policies being grounded in a clear set of regulatory objectives.
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While IP Australia does have a role in granting inventions, it does not have a role in enforcing patents (patentees have to bring actions themselves), preventing infringement or monitoring the behaviour of patent attorneys. IP Australia does consider reforms to the operation of the Patents Act; however, it does not have a role in setting overall policy with respect to the patent system. 10 Patents Act s 18. 11 The Act, for example, establishes the opposition procedure (Chapter 5) which enables parties to assert that a patent application, despite having been examined, does not meet the requirements of patentability. The
Act also contains prescribes a number of offences, including those relating to the making of false representations: ss 177-178.
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account of the historical context of the rules that we have in place now. Commentators seem to perceive the system as stable despite the changes that have taken place over time and despite the contingent nature of what are seen as the underlying principles of the law.
The contextualised nature of two aspects of the system will be highlighted here -the conception of "knowledge" and the discipline of economics.
Patents and History of Knowledge
One of the key shifts in the operation of the patent system that has taken place from
Elizabethan to the present is noted by all but remarked on by few. The patents granted by the early modern monarchs, and as encapsulated in Coke's use of the term "new manufactures", 12 were for practical devices -to the extent they weren't granted for regulating industries or allowing individuals to not abide by the statutes of Parliament.
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These days, the "public interest in allowing patents is said to flow from the fact that the numerous patents that have been granted over time constitute a substantive and valuable database of technical and scientific knowledge". 14 That is, there has been a shift in focus from the creation of artefacts to an emphasis, in this century, on how an invention adds to From an intellectual perspective, Isaac Newton published his Principia Mathematica in 1687 and the Royal Society was granted its first Royal Charter in 1662. 16 Porter, more generally, states that the "half-century after 1660 brought decisive transformations" to the structures and ideologies of England. 17 In other words, the manner in which people thought about ideas, and even the process of thinking itself, 18 changed radically in the decades after the passing of the Statute.
The effect of this on the understanding of the conception of the patent system is that there can be no certainty as to how Coke would have perceived the possibility of patenting "ideas". 19 Patents in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries covered whatever was already in existence. They were granted for things such as cutlery, mills for grinding corn and devices for raising water from mines. 20 If the patents that covered the regulation of industries are included, it is easy to see the grants of these monopolies in terms of the Crown wanting to maintain control -either of sectors such as ale-houses or of industries such as mining. 21 The patented inventions themselves tended to be devices that were known 16 From a political perspective, the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688 is seen as a marker for the beginning of the period. principles were patentable was raised as a concern in the decisions of the courts only after the Enlightenment. 26 It may, now, be law that mere principles are not patentable, 27 but this is just a construct of the modern mindset -this does not make it wrong, just historically contingent.
Patents and History of Economics
There has also been a significant shift in the understanding of matters economic since the time of the Statute to today. During the time of James I, the patent system operated in accordance with the mercantilist understanding of the market. I say the "market" advisedly as the concept of the "economy" came later in the history of ideas. 28 The system supported the mercantilist worldview in that it reduced unemployment and improved England's balance of trade. 29 It also allowed the Crown, through its agents (the patentees) to regulate important, or problematic, 30 industries.
During the nineteenth century, patents were understood in terms of the classical "ought to be both compensated and rewarded for it". 31 This is also evident in the decisions of the courts. For example, the Privy Council stated that "when a party has shown great ingenuity in an invention, and, from want of capital and means, has not been able to obtain an adequate return, we have over and over again extended the patent". 32 In a later case, the Council also noted that it was appropriate that the "inventor who … made the invention public for the benefit of the community, has his fair reward for his ingenuity, and his industry, and the capital which he has employed".
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These days, most economists argue for patents on the basis that they are an incentive for firms, or individuals, to invest in research and development (R&D). 34 According to one commentator, "economic theory tells us that more investment in R&D should lead to more innovation and more innovation should fuel GDP growth". 35 The courts have acknowledged that this is now a key justification for the patent system. 36 There is, however, a significant difference between seeing patents as rewards and patents as incentives. 37 In the former, an individual who exhibits the requisite inventiveness should receive a reward for her or his endeavours. On the other hand, if a patent is only an incentive, there is no guarantee that an inventor will financially benefit from her or his ingenuity -the inventor, and not the state, accepts the risk that the inventive effort will be both technically beneficial and commercially successful.
Benefits of Seeing Current Patent System through a Regulatory Lens
Taken together, the discussion of the antecedent bodies of knowledge demonstrates that there are no "eternal truths" to the patent system -the bases of the system have changed since its inception. 38 If there are no such truths, then there is no concrete foundation upon which to found normative claims about the system. And yet it makes sense that there are limits to what is patentable -otherwise, if everything was entitled to a patent then the system becomes meaningless. The alternative offered here is an approach that does not require eternal truths. To see the patent system through a regulatory lens allows for the adoption of reforms that support an internally consistent view of the overall system that will facilitate the better regulation of innovation in this country. There is not the space here to articulate completely a regulatory view of the Patents Act; however, there is the space to highlight key benefits of such an approach.
Clarity of Scope of the Patent System
If the goal of the system is to be seen as regulatory, then there is pressure to be clear about the limits and purposes of the regime. It is when the reach and the expected standards of behaviour are effectively communicated that compliance is enhanced. The first question to be asked in this context, then, is what is actually meant by the "patent system"?
Clarity about the extent of the patent system
For many commentators, the patent system is -and is only -the set of rules regarding patentability, with those rules arising from the national patent laws and the international agreements on patents. 39 This paper argues from the position that the system is much 38 There may, nonetheless, be statements that can be seen to be "temporary" truths or, more properly, norms.
One example of that, relating to patents for genetic inventions, would be the ratio of the NRDC case relating to the requirement that an invention, to be patentable, has to reflect an "artificial state of affairs". 39 One leading textbook has a chapter entitled "The Patent System" with all but one paragraph devoted to a history of patent law and a description of the processes of gaining patent protection (that odd paragraph out is headed "Role of patent attorneys"): J McKeough, A Stewart and P Griffith, Intellectual Property in broader than that. 40 The additional breadth is two-fold. First, there is an acknowledgment that there is more to the Patents Act than just the tests of patentability. Second, the patent system can be seen to include all the decisions, and the constraints on those decisions, that are made by parties when they are dealing with aspects of the Act.
With respect to the Act itself, it is a complex piece of legislation. Not only does it regulate patent applicants and patentees, it controls the behaviour of the Commissioner of Patents (and the Commissioner's delegates) including the maintenance of the Register of Patents.
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Importantly too, the Act regulates the patent attorney profession, 42 the Crown 43 and the courts -to the extent they have jurisdiction to hear patent cases. 44 In other words, the Act is not just about the validity of patents.
Further, the system can be best seen as the totality of decisions and actions made by those parties who operate within it -with those actions and decisions being constrained by a number of factors that includes the limits of the Act as well as other, non-legal, concerns.
Attorneys, for example, advise clients as to the patentability of technological developments made by the client; the decision of the client as to whether to apply for a patent will also depend on the overall business strategy of the company (it may be noted that a decision to not seek patent protection should also be seen as part of the patent system). Other research has shown that firms also have multiple reasons for pursuing patent protection. These 324-327. 40 It is acknowledged that some commentators do consider matters beyond the legislation when they consider the patent system. Those that do tend not to define the boundaries of the system. See, for example, E include a desire to protect technology; create "retaliatory power against competitors"; create "better possibilities of selling licences"; provide "motivation for employees to invent"; provide a "measure of R & D productivity"; and improve the "corporate image".
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These reasons are the result of the monopoly protection offered by the patent, the economic value of that protection as seen by other companies and individuals as well as the noneconomic value that attaches to a patent as an indicator of innovation. These reasons, therefore, stem directly from the operation of the Act and, as a result, the decisions that are based on these reasons should be seen as part of the overall patent system.
Clarity about who it is that will be regulated
This understanding of the scope of the system means that a broad range of people are seen to be regulated by the system. A simplistic view of the Act would have the regulated be limited to inventors -as it is the inventors who are seen as benefiting from the monopoly on offer. A more nuanced view would see the regulated as including the companies who employ the inventors as, for many industries, it takes the capital of a firm (or capital available to a firm) to invest in R&D. 46 The approach taken here, however, sees all who make decisions, and take actions, around the patenting of innovations as those to be regulated by the system -though the scale of the regulatory action would vary depending on the extent to which the individuals use aspects of the system.
A key aspect of this regulatory approach to the patent system is that it enables the acknowledgement, and use, of a specific understanding of those who are to be regulated. The centrality of norms to the regulation of those involved in the patent system then prompts the question as to the role of "old" norms after a system has been changed radically. The precise link between norms and laws varies depending upon the theoretical framework adopted; for this article, however, it is sufficient to suggest that the consideration of the patent system from a regulatory perspective is not likely to result in radical amendments to the Patents Act and, therefore, most of the existing norms will continue to guide the actions and decisions of those subject to its regulation. incentive. However, it is also important to note that the purpose, or purposes, of the whole system may not be the same as the purpose of an individual patent. acknowledge the necessary link between the norms of a regulatory system and it purpose/s. 58 Given the range of behaviours that are sought to be regulated by the system, it
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is not too much of a stretch to consider that there may be more than one purpose to the patent system. One of the key insights from the theory of decentred regulation is that a regulatory regime may be "fragmented". 59 This means that there does not have to be a single regulatory goal. In turn, this means that any objectives inserted into the Act may reflect the multiple purposes that the Act has in the innovation system. 60 Further, the goals and those who are to be regulated are "interdependent". 61 That is, the purposes align with the interests of those who participate in the system in that the motivation for an individual's participation is that the purposes do align with her or his interests. The range of individuals and interests they possess almost requires that there is more than one purpose to the system.
A key decision with respect to the interests of individuals considered here is the one that an innovator, or her or his employer, will make is whether or not to seek a patent for an innovation. The Act will be most applicable where the innovation both meets the requirements for patentability and it makes commercial sense to apply for a patent. 62 Trade secrecy, for example, is used much more in some industries than patents are. 63 The purposes of the system, as opposed to just the Act, have to incorporate those aspects of the 58 To take an example from outside the patent system, the purposes associated with the road rules include system that give rise to the decisions made that avoid the Patent Office. That is, the purposes of the system should be clear with respect to the policy desire to increase, or decrease, the level of patenting (as opposed to the level of innovation). It is possible that the level of patenting now, despite the variation across industries, is currently optimal; it is perhaps more likely that it is sub-optimal. To better know the purposes of the system will facilitate the implementation of better innovation policy; further, to the extent that patents are monopolies, to better know the purposes of the patent system may also facilitate the implementation of better competition policy.
Clarity of Exceptions to Patentability
The work has not yet been done with respect to detailing all the purposes of the broad patent system. An encompassing understanding of the scope and purposes of the patent system, however, will allow for an assessment of those inventions that should not be patentable on the grounds that they are not consistent with the system and its purposes. An example of how an exception from patentability may be inherent in a purpose of the system may be found in the early history of the system. One of the key exceptions to patentability in the early modern period was for inventions that have put people out of work -this is a dominant understanding of the "generally inconvenient" provision in the Statute. 64 This is not surprising because the encouragement of employment was a central justification of the patent system in the early modern period. 65 To allow labour-saving inventions to be patented, therefore, would have been counter to the regulatory goal of the system.
The justification for this exception was, in part, moral. Both of the key reporters of the 1602
case Darcy v Allen (the infamous playing cards decision) cited scripture in their reports -64 Dent, above n 12, 445-6.
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Coke referred to Deuteronomy 24 verse 6 66 and Noy quoted 2 Thessalonians 3 verses 8-
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. 67 The latter quote being "every man should live by labour, and that he that will not labour, let him not eat" -if a person could not work, the person would starve. It would be possible, too, for there to be a moral basis for any exceptions inherent in today's patent system. The normative standard for such an exception may, however, be difficult to achieve consensus over. The lack of dominant religious doctrine now (unlike in early modern England 68 ) may, for example, mean that some would find an invention for euthanasia morally repugnant, while others may applaud it as a tool for enhancing "death with dignity".
Instead, the basis for any exceptions to patentability inherent in the system may be secular.
A good example of this may be the "research use exemption" that has recently become part of the current Act. 69 If the purposes of the system include one related to accountability, 70 then the incorporation of an exception for infringement that allows people other than a patentee to check the limits of an innovation against the claims of the patent enhances the level of accountability. 71 This also accords with the conceptualisation of those regulated by if the claims in a patent (that deny the competitors access to a market) delimit, accurately, the innovation. Of course, the aspect of the exemption relating to the improvement of patented inventions 72 also accords with any purpose of the system that privileges innovation.
A reconceptualising of the purposes of the system could also lead to a revisiting of the current exceptions. As highlighted above, discoveries are currently excluded from patentability. Given that the High Court has acknowledged that the "distinction between discovery and invention is not precise", 73 it may be open to see discoveries as patentable.
From this perspective, such "inventions" would be understood as extreme upstream research -the research use exemption would allow other researchers to improve it. Any follow-on researchers would still be able patent any practical developments they make, though a licensing fee may be payable to the original "inventor" if the subsequent invention uses the discovery in its operation. This may, in effect, operate as an incentive for "pure science" research -a public policy goal that many would agree with. 75 TRIPS Agreement art 27(3)(a).
